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BEHAVIOUR ON A BEER MAT:  
LAW, INTERDISCIPLINARITY & 
EXPERTISE 
Nicky Priaulx & Martin Weinel† 
Abstract 
 In this paper we seek to offer an original theoretical platform for thinking 
about the nature of legal knowledge produced through ‘legal 
interdisciplinarity.’ The context for our discussion is the emergence of a 
‘behavioural boom’ in the field of law where researchers increasingly turn to 
fields like behavioural economics to encourage shifts in legal and social 
governance architecture. Using a case study which explores the application of 
a sub-branch of psychology to civil law, we highlight serious concerns 
attending the capacity of lone legal researchers to meaningfully navigate non-
legal domains. Central to our analysis, is the sociology of expertise and 
experience, and it is from this perspective that we explore the interdisciplinary 
process. Drawing attention to the extent to which largely “unwritten” 
practices and conventions inhabit disciplines and how these govern 
knowledge, we point to the insurmountable barriers confronting lone legal 
interdisciplinarians. We illustrate why that work, by contrast with genuine 
collaborative/interactional interdisciplinary research, should be regarded as 
lacking value from a policy/political perspective. This is not, however, to 
diminish the potential value of works of a non-collaborative nature. Noting the 
value of interdisciplinary work of a more provisional and creative character, 
and its critical importance to the legal project, we draw a critical distinction 
between interactional research and simulated research. This distinction we 
argue proves critical to identifying what interdisciplinary work can lend itself 
to policy application and that which cannot, as well as accommodating the 
fullest range of interdisciplinary research efforts to flourish. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we seek to offer an original theoretical platform for thinking 
about the nature of legal knowledge produced through ‘legal 
interdisciplinarity.’  The context for our discussion is the emergence of a 
‘behavioural boom’ in the field of law where researchers increasingly turn to 
fields like behavioural economics and allied disciplines as a means of 
encouraging shifts in legal and social governance architecture.1  Our 
contribution raises serious concerns about the capacity of legal researchers to 
meaningfully navigate non-legal domains and the value of such work in policy-
making terms.2  While the considerations raised here are not restricted to legal 
knowledge as it emerges through the scholastic interdisciplinary paradigm this 
is the primary context we use to operationalize our concerns.3 
We articulate our concerns through a case study which illustrates both the 
 
 1.  See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavior Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of 
Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 717 (2000) (“[L]egal writers have turned with enthusiasm to 
other disciplines to broaden their perspective. Economic analysis of law is, of course, the predominant 
example of legal analysts’ turn to social science. By utilizing economic principles to explain and predict legal 
norms, the economic approach presents a largely unified, objective perspective on what the law is and what it 
should be.”); see also id. at 718 (“[L]egal scholars are turning enthusiastically to another social science that 
enriches the analysis of human decision making, called behavioral decision theory (BDT). This discipline 
seeks to explain and predict people’s decisions and to account for their propensity when making decisions to 
depart from the predictions of the wealth-maximization principle.”). 
 2.  See Hillman, supra note 1, at 718 (“[I]n employing BDT, legal writers face the following dilemma: 
As a whole, BDT explains that human behaviour is complex and contradictory.  Taken this broadly, BDT is 
not likely to contribute very successfully to instrumental legal reform, which, of course, requires understanding 
the probable effect of law on human behaviour.  Alternatively, if legal theorists focus too narrowly on 
particular behavioural observations, their analysis will be no more realistic than predictions based on economic 
analysis’s wealth-maximization precept.”). 
 3.  The concerns we raise in respect of legal knowledge have application to legal practice and the 
everyday stuff of law (e.g., in the courtroom, articulated by judges, by cross-examining barristers, through 
client interviews, legal evaluation of medical reports in the preparation of a case).  Law is inherently inter-
institutional and inter-disciplinary, for as Samuel notes, “to say anything sensible about rules”, entails drawing 
upon alternative “schemes, methods, paradigms, propositions, categories, and concepts from outside law.”  
Geoffrey Samuel, English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 335, 343 (2004). 
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promise and perils of legal interdisciplinarity by focusing upon the work of 
two American researchers, Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, who 
engage psychological theory to encourage significant shifts in the civil law of 
damages.4  While the work is indicative of a strong and growing trend towards 
using insights from the behavioural sciences to inform social and legal 
governance architecture, the so-called “behavioural turn” in legal studies,5 it 
delivers a striking example of the kinds of problems which legal scholars, 
enthused with new perspectives, can run into.6  Illustrating serious concerns 
around the authors’ interpretation of a sub-branch of psychology and strong 
claims as to the justificatory force it provides for legal policy reform, we note 
that such practices are far from one-offs in the legal enterprise. 
Yet, notwithstanding the problems we highlight, there is still great value 
to be found in the interdisciplinary endeavour.  As one mode of intellectual 
cross-fertilization, “interdisciplinarity” traditionally expresses the attempt to 
create some kind of dialogue, typically occurring in a university environment, 
between different disciplines.7  Yet despite its championed status 
interdisciplinarity nevertheless constitutes a highly ambiguous term.8  Applied 
loosely in practice, “to describe – and justify – a very wide range of academic 
inquiry” as Moran notes, “interdisciplinarity has a tendency to be all things to 
all people.”9  Given the impossibility of defining how precisely one should 
interact with other knowledge domains, coupled with the relative novelty of 
interdisciplinarity,10 cross-disciplinary collaboration11 and research methods 
training for legal academics,12 it is unsurprising that resulting interdisciplinary 
 
 4.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 751 (2007) (arguing that hedonic damages should not be awarded based on 
disability because “people with disabilities tend not to believe that their disabilities limit the ability to enjoy 
life” even though “people without disabilities have a much more pessimistic view.”). 
 5.  Sabine Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociologial Critique of the Behavioural Turn in Law and 
Economics, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 289, 289 (2011) (“While there has been an increasing emphasis on 
economic perspectives at the expense of sociological perspectives within the field of law, economy, and 
society, a major shift can now also be observed in the field of law and economics.  With the behavioural turn 
in law and economics, homo economicus seems to be transformed into Homer Economicus . . . .”). 
 6.  See Hillman supra note 1, at 718 (explaining that if legal theorists focus narrowly on behavioural 
observations, “their analysis will be no more realistic than predictions based on economic analysis’s wealth-
maximization precept.”).  
 7.  See ALLEN F. REPKO, INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH - PROCESS AND THEORY 3–4 (2d ed. 2012), 
available at http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/43242_1.pdf (“Generalist interdisciplinarians understand 
interdisciplinarity loosely to mean ‘any form of dialog or interaction between two or more disciplines’ while 
minimizing, obscuring, or rejecting altogether the role of integration . . . .  Integrationist 
interdisciplinarians . . . believe that integration should be the goal of interdisciplinary work because integration 
addresses the challenge of complexity.”) 
 8.  JOE MORAN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY 1–2 (2d ed. 2010). 
 9.  Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J. L. SOC’Y 163, 164 (2004). 
 10.  See Wendy Schrama, How to Carry Out Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Experiences with 
an Interdisciplinary Research Method, 7 UTRECHT L. REV. 147, 160 (2011) (noting that the paper partly 
“concerns the integration of the non-legal data, which show a significant divergence between the legal and the 
real reality, into the legal domain”); see also id. at 161 (stating that “there is a real challenge in building 
bridges between the legal discipline and other sciences.”). 
 11.  Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 817 (1999) (“Law 
professors could collaborate with other scholars who possess experience and expertise in empirical research.  
Collaboration is a well-established norm in most academic disciplines, especially in the social and hard 
sciences.”). 
 12.  Paddy Hillyard, Invoking Indignation: Reflections on Future Directions of Socio-legal Studies, 29 J. 
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works demonstrate a vast range of approaches, varying degrees of 
methodological quality, and broad variations in the extent to which legal 
scholars exhibit understanding of the theories and concepts they work with.13  
While this presents problems in adjudging the value and quality of the 
resulting works, the imposition of tougher guidelines to ensure quality 
assurance correspondingly risks killing off the kind of creative and exploratory 
mindset which is both desirable and critically important to the development of 
any field, including law.14  How to promote the broadest freedom in legal 
interdisciplinarity whilst providing the tools for assessing the value of those 
efforts constitutes our current problem domain.  As such, while the temptation 
to ‘discipline’ interdisciplinary efforts in law might well be strong, we advance 
an alternative approach. 
In our view, a stronger appreciation and reflexivity on the part of 
researchers around the question of what counts as knowledge is likely to be 
more critical in the long run for informing good interdisciplinary practice, and 
indeed, robust socio-legal research.  As such, we outline a framework which 
we believe proves critical for enhancing and broadening legal researchers’ 
appreciation of the nature of knowledge and the social processes critical for its 
formation and recognition.  The theoretical platform for that framework is the 
sociology of expertise and experience,15 and it is from this perspective that we 
explore the interdisciplinary process of crossing disciplinary boundaries into 
alternative bodies of knowledge, which in the absence of commanding dual-
disciplinary expertise, will constitute foreign theoretical domains.  We draw 
attention to the extent to which largely “unwritten” practices and conventions 
occupy disciplines, and how these govern knowledge, ‘give meaning’ to it and 
operate to heavily anchor knowledge to its home domain.16  This not only 
means that knowledge is highly domain-specific, but that it will be largely out 
of reach to those specialized in other domains.  Intersecting with Vick’s 
exposition of the “traps for the unwary”17 awaiting legal interdisciplinarians, 
our analysis suggests that this discourse underplays aspects of a problem which 
is far more significant in practice. Certainly, for the lone interdisciplinarian, 
those traps may be insurmountable.18  This argument is strongly underpinned 
 
L. SOC’Y 645, 646 (2002) (“I wish to take a broad-brush approach and suggest that the future direction of 
sociolegal research should be informed by less theory and more moral indignation.”); see also Schrama, supra 
note 10, at 152–53 (“[L]egal researchers have had no training in the collection of large-scale data sets, nor 
qualitative methods, such as interviews with respondents.”).  
 13.  Erika Arban, Interdisciplinary Approaches to Legal Research: Law and Economics and Critical 
Legal Studies from a North American Perspective, AMMINISTRAZIONE IN CAMMINO 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/E.Arban_giur-cost2.pdf (noting 
interdisciplinary legal approaches such as law and economics and critical legal studies.). 
 14.  See Schrama, supra note 10, at 151 (noting that the type of interdisciplinary research determines the 
methodological requirements, as well as pitfalls in general regarding interdisciplinary research: unilateral and 
multilateral). 
 15.  HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007).  
 16.  See generally WRITING FOR SCHOLARLY PUBLICATION: BEHIND THE SCENES IN LANGUAGE 
EDUCATION 234 (Christine Pears Casanave & Stephanie Vandrick, eds., 2003) (explaining how one learns 
unwritten rules by engaging in their disciplinary community). 
 17.  Vick, supra note 9, at 185.   
 18.  See generally id. (stating that a legal scholar will inevitably make one of a number of possible 
errors). 
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by the “normative theory of expertises” as it has been developed by Collins 
and Evans in the field of science and technology studies.19  Collins and Evans 
provide one of the most comprehensive engagements with expertise by 
constructing a substantive and multi-dimensional theory that links expertise to 
the acquisition of “[t]acit knowledge”–“knowledge that is not explicated,”20 
which plays a crucial role in all meaningful human activities, whether gaining 
a “deep understanding” and mastering of specialist skills in domains such as 
high energy physics or medicine, or even ubiquitous skills such as speaking 
one’s native language or riding a bicycle in traffic.21  Insofar as tacit 
knowledge, which proves critical to making sense of explicit knowledge, can 
only be acquired through social immersion in the expert domain in question, 
this points to significant impediments to interdisciplinary research.22 
Despite this, the application of the theory of expertises to legal 
interdisciplinarity supports a far more positive analysis, which we develop 
here.  It provides an epistemic framework and practical guide for assessing the 
widest variety of works under the interdisciplinary umbrella.23  In particular, 
we distinguish between two kinds of interdisciplinary research: simulation 
(“crash test”) research, which embraces the kind of creative mindset 
necessary for the discovery and elimination of new questions,24 research angles 
and modeling hypotheses,25 and interactional research, in which researchers 
exploring foreign bodies of knowledge collaborate or interact directly with 
specialists from the target domain.26  Insofar as these two kinds of 
interdisciplinary approaches are valuable for the development of legal 
knowledge, the kind of weight we can place upon them must differ.  This 
proves critical to establishing the policy value of research, given that 
interdisciplinary works are seen as increasingly relevant to social governance 
architecture in the political sphere.27  In addressing this latter issue, while work 
which arises as a result of “deep understanding” holds strong value in policy 
terms, we nevertheless argue that interdisciplinary approaches falling short of 
this standard remain valuable.  It is from highly experimental, haphazard and 
 
 19.  COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 15; see also Harry Collins & Robert Evans, The Third Wave of 
Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32 SOC. STUD. SCI. 235, 235 (2002) (explaining the need 
for a normative theory of expertise to establish grounds for limiting technical decision making rights).   
 20.  HARRY COLLINS, TACIT AND EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE 1 (2010).  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  See Alan Frost, The Different Types of Knowledge, KMT (2013), http://knowledge-management-
tools.net/different-types-of-knowledge.html (explaining how tacit knowledge differs from explicit knowledge). 
 23.  COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 15. 
 24.  C.R. KOTHARI & GARG GAURAV, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 4 (3d ed. 
2014). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, IMPROVING KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER BETWEEN RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
AND INDUSTRY ACROSS EUROPE 7–16 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/knowledge-
sharing-european-commission-182-2007-en-pub.pdf (describing the benefit of knowledge transfer between 
research institutions and industry for Europe).  
 27.  See Susan Owens & Louise Driffill, How to Change Attitudes and Behaviours in the Context of 
Energy, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 4412, 4415 (2008) (discussing how interdisciplinary work might help develop more 
productive and genuine dialogue between disciplines to make a substantial contribution to policy formulation 
and implementation). 
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even mistaken engagements that strikingly important hypotheses can arise.28  
As such, the aim here is to provide a theoretical platform which allows a 
critical demarcation to be drawn between simulated and interactional research 
in order to accommodate the fullest range of interdisciplinary research efforts 
to flourish.29 
II. THE BEHAVIOURAL TURN 
In the context of a voluminous socio-legal critique which has long 
lamented law’s resistance to external knowledge, both as a functioning field of 
practice30 and as an academic enterprise,31 the emergence of what has been 
coined the “behavioural turn” in legal studies should undoubtedly be 
welcomed.32  Arguably, that “turn” may be indicative of a “flash point” or 
critical confluence of earlier works which created the case for the 
transformation of a field where, according to Samuel, to resolve modern day 
issues, one could still appeal to Roman law knowledge.33  Law’s epistemic 
foundations and efficacy have not merely constituted enduring subjects for 
analysis, but central preoccupations for socio-legal, critical legal theory and 
feminist scholarship.34 
Within these traditions scholars have long drawn upon a broad range of 
techniques and disciplinary knowledge by which to demonstrate how law is 
predicated upon false images of humanity by virtue of a fatal disconnect from 
“social reality.”35  Emphasizing how “real people” and “real institutions” 
frequently deviate from legal characterizations, socio-legal theorists 
powerfully illustrate how so much of legal knowledge is founded upon 
unsubstantiated claims,36 where judicial narratives constitute “proxies for the 
 
 28.  See generally ROYSTON M. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY: ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERIES IN SCIENCE (1989) 
(explaining that many scientific discoveries such as Teflon, Velcro, nylon, x-rays, and penicillin actually came 
about by accident). 
 29.  We focus here upon introducing to a legal audience a range of novel theoretical and practical 
considerations which arise from the theory of expertise as they apply to legal interdisciplinarity. For the greater 
part we treat (legal) interdisciplinarity as both a contemporary and desirable practice, rather than as a historical 
artifact or an activity that demands justification.  See generally Paul J. Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner 
Party: A (Short) Manifesto on The Necessity of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1577, 1577–91 (exploring the need for an increase in interdisciplinary legal scholarship); Roger Cotterrell, 
Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies, 29 J.L. SOC’Y 632, 632–44 (2002) 
(examining alternative directions for sociolegal studies in Britain outisde of theory). But see Vick, supra note 
9, at 164 (explaining the looseness of the term “interdisciplinarity” and establishing a minimum concrete 
definition). 
 30.  See generally John Flood, Socio-Legal Ethnography, in THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIO-LEGAL 
RESEARCH 34 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers, eds., 2005) (addressing the relationship between ethnography 
and the practice of law); see also Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project, 27 J.L. 
SOC’Y 351, 351 (2000) (addressing the relationship between gender and the law); Samuel, supra note 3, at 342 
(discussing the value of the law as an intellectual discipline).  
 31.  See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2001) (discussing academic enterprises and the law); Vick, supra note 9 (explaining the effects of 
interdisciplinary research on the practice of law). 
 32.  Frerichs, supra note 5, at 292. 
 33.  Geoffrey Samuel, Is Legal Knowledge Cumulative?, 32 LEGAL STUD. 448, 474 (2012). 
 34.  DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE 105–06 (1989).  
 35.  See generally id. (explaining the disconnect between the law and social reality).  
 36.  Tracey Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure - And 
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real world”,37 promote a form of professional reasoning which inhabits a world 
of “virtual fact,”38 or constitutive of a form of political rhetoric, a “confidence 
trick” designed to “induce public confidence in a system that is not, after all, 
founded upon any actual social science principles.”39  As such, the conception 
of a “behavioural turn” while seemingly novel, has deep roots – it is significant 
for building upon rather than constituting part of a lengthy struggle against 
legal conservatism in articulating the claim that legal knowledge sits upon 
shaky epistemic foundations.40  Instead, that claim has transformed into the 
critical backdrop for a new mode of inquiry where concepts of “legal efficacy,” 
“socio-legal gaps” and “virtual fact” are not merely interesting socio-legal 
artifacts to play with at the margins of legal thought, but objects of inquiry 
which go to the heart of law’s authority in practice.41  Insofar as law’s 
regulatory authority stands upon its capacity to govern human actors, the 
perpetuation of a paradigm orientation within law that continues to stand apart 
from the natural and human sciences, where research and reasoning is 
motivated by a “spirit of inquiry and validation,”42 is one that undermines the 
project of law itself. 
The “turn” towards the behavioural sciences should be seen as potentially 
significant for giving broad and respectable voice to claims that were once 
seen as radical, explicitly political and marginal.43  As such, it appears to come 
with a new energy and sense of momentum.44  No doubt part of the reason for 
this is an increasing “popular” science consciousness amongst legal academics 
and policy-makers.45  Popular “science” bestsellers such as Nudge46 and 
Freakonomics47 have proved highly successful in capturing a critical mass, not 
only appealing to a wide audience of consumers, ranging from members of the 
public, to policy-makers and lawyers,48 but capturing the political 
imagination.49  As such, fresh attempts to interrogate existing legal architecture 
and “legal knowledge” through behavioural insights may seem that much more 
appealing for lawyers.  Insofar as disciplines including law have traditionally 
 
Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 858–59. 
 37.  Flood, supra note 30, at 34.  
 38.  Geoffrey Samuel, Can Legal Reasoning be Demystified?, 29 LEGAL STUD. 181, 210 n.186 (2009). 
 39.  Samuel, supra note 33, at 452.  
 40.  See Jaakko Husa, Turning the Curriculum Upside Down: Comparative Law As an Educational Tool 
for Constructing the Pluralistic Legal Mind, 10 GER. L.J. 913, 914 (2009) (explaining the importance of  the 
behavioural turn); Samuel, supra note 39, at 204 (discussing the intellectual paradigms that give validity to 
theoretical legal models of thought). 
 41.  Samuel, supra note 38, at 204. 
 42.  Id. at 204.  
 43.  Frerichs, supra note 5, at 290.  
 44.  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 16 (2002) (detailing the progression stemming from using a behavioural sciences approach); 
Frerichs, supra note 5, at 290 (explaining the importance of viewing lawyers as “consumers of economic 
wisdom.”). 
 45.  Frerichs, supra note 5, at 290. 
 46.  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (Michael O’Malley et al. eds., 2008). 
 47.  STEVEN D. LEVITT AND STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE 
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005). 
 48.  Frerichs, supra note 5, at 289.   
 49.  See id. at 290 (discussing how Nudge offers “recommendations for public policy and law . . . .”). 
368 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY [Vol. 2014 
sought to profit from the prestige of science, and “the intellectual and cultural 
authority of these fields,”50 the popular science movement achieves something 
new—it makes “hard science” seemingly intelligible and accessible to all.51  
Moreover in the case of works like Nudge,52 which explicitly link behavioural 
theory to problem domains of legal and regulatory import, the case for 
regarding behavioural science as an important and critical resource for law 
becomes more evident, credible, and legitimate.53  When one adds to the mix 
the promises from some quarters of behavioural science that such knowledge 
offers policy-makers a means of influencing human behaviour without the 
need for regulation, in a way that could yield “huge effects on outcomes, from 
increasing savings to improving health care to providing organs for life saving 
transplant operations . . .,”54 despite some arguing that those claims are 
inflated,55 the opportunity to gain a better understanding of human behaviour, 
is one that legal theorists and policy-makers alike would seem highly 
imprudent to ignore.  The potential for empirically-based insights to 
“contribute to an increased effectiveness of the legal system”56 seems so 
obvious in light of the many mysteries of law’s operation in society.  Questions 
concerning law’s efficacy, whether legal solutions achieve their goals in 
society or have the “expected effect on people’s behaviour,” and whether the 
presumptions about the real world that undergird legal provisions and judicial 
pronouncements are realistic,57 are all fundamentally questions about human 
nature.  As such, there are good reasons for welcoming legal scholarship 
which illustrates a stronger appetite for making incursions into the behavioural 
sciences. 
While not doubting the potential for the behavioural sciences to help 
illuminate possible routes for achieving more effective legal and social 
governance architecture, amongst the positive and negative commentaries 
around popular works such as Nudge, remarkably little critique reflects upon 
what we regard as a core concern: the legal translation of ‘insights’ from the 
behavioural sciences and other bodies of knowledge.  Insofar as Samuel has 
long lamented that lawyers have been able to “construct theory models without 
having to concern themselves too much with external reality,” a paradigm 
orientation “that might be described as one of authority rather than inquiry,” 
 
 50.  STEPHEN H. KELLERT, BORROWED KNOWLEDGE: CHAOS THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
LEARNING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 71 (2008).  
 51.  See Karen Yeung, Nudge as Fudge, 75 MOD. L. REV. 122, 129 (2012) (“Nudge is an example of the 
‘new’ law and economics, albeit presented in a popularly accessible form rather than written primarily for an 
academic audience.”). 
 52.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note, 46. 
 53.  See Frerichs, supra note 5, at 291 (explaining the acceptance of behavioural science as ancillary to 
the law).  
 54.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 8.  
 55.  SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SELECT COMMITTEE, BEHAVIOUR CHANGE, 2010–12, H.L. 179, ¶ 26–31 
(U.K.); Evan Selinger & Kyle P. Whyte, Nudging Cannot Solve Complex Policy Problems, 1 EUR. J. RISK 
REG. 26, 30 (2012); Yeung, supra note 51, at 147.  
 56.  Schrama, supra note 10, at 162. 
 57.  Id. at 148; see also Geoffrey Samuel, Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law 
Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?, 36 J.L. SOC’Y 431, 450 (2009) (discussing the 
functionality of judicial pronouncements). 
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here we illustrate the kind of fundamental barriers that stand in the way of law 
and legal scholars making a shift towards an approach motivated by “a spirit of 
inquiry and . . . validation” where assertions are “supported by evidence and 
be, at least in principle, testable.”58 
A. Law Meets the Science of Happiness 
Undoubtedly central to the success of popular science works, like Nudge, 
is the care taken to make “science” accessible and in one sense 
“understandable.”  Yet hidden between the lines of Nudge sits a staggering 
body of scientific work which the authors have gone to some effort to 
synthesise and critically, translate to make it both presentable and accessible.  
The expertise of Nudge’s authors, and team of research assistants, coupled with 
their conscious effort to make it appeal to the broadest audience, means that a 
good deal of the “science” behind Nudge can and must fade out of view.  
Behind the scenes will sit a long and arduous process of rooting out what 
science to include or not.  In this latter regard, the Nudge team inevitably will 
have filtered out those scientific papers viewed as unreliable, being based upon 
an inappropriate research design, for yielding inconsistent results, for having 
insufficient controls, being contradicted by later research,59 for being retracted, 
or even exposed as fraudulent.60  A broad range of considerations need to 
attend a systematic review of the literature in determining the validity, results 
and relevance of that research before using it – a process Greenhalgh calls, 
“the science of ‘trashing’ papers.”61  Which is part of science itself (and that’s 
before Thaler and Sunstein get to the job of selecting those studies that seem in 
their view, germane to their central hypothesis).  Not all science is equal and 
not all science is good science.  As such, works of the Nudge variety can 
elegantly mask not only what is a bewilderingly large research effort, but also 
the science of science. 
The science of science refers to the processes of evaluating what 
constitutes reliable knowledge or not.62  This is a critical step.  It is an 
understanding of science that is generalizable and reaches well beyond 
particular “scientific facts” to be able to question the foundations upon which 
those facts have been arrived at. Even within sub-branches of science, such as 
 
 58.  Samuel, supra note 38, at 203–06.  
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About), 315 BRIT. MED. J. 243, 243 (1997). 
 62.  See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY: A FEDERAL RESEARCH 
ROADMAP 1 (2008) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/NSTC%20Reports/ 
39924_PDF%20Proof.pdf (describing the science of science policy). 
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medicine and the health sciences, researchers working within those fields are 
cautioned that the literature is akin to a jungle, “fast growing, full of dead 
wood, sprinkled with hidden treasure and infested with spiders and snakes.”63 
Yet while experts in those fields will have techniques for helping to identify 
the difference between a snake and a treasure, for others, particularly those not 
possessed of the ‘science of science’ perspective, science can look deceptively 
like a walk in the park. Increasingly, much of scientific work is reported in 
seemingly intelligible language with standardized structures so that they appear 
fairly readable. However, in situations where a scientific paper may correspond 
with aspects of our everyday lives, or indeed core concepts and ideas appear to 
also form the subject of investigation in alternative academic disciplines, 
science papers may not only seem readable, but comprehensible. 
In this latter respect, ‘happiness’ is something that all but the chronically 
sad will have insight and experience in, even if few of us are in the business of 
scientifically testing it. For decades psychologists in the field of hedonic 
psychology have been thinking about the puzzles around how happiness is 
fostered, lost and regained.64  To lawyers, hedonic psychology might be best 
labelled ‘happiness studies’ insofar as the dominant measure used in the theory 
of ‘hedonic adaption’ or more recently, ‘adaptive preferences’, is happiness. In 
the original 1970s theory, Brickman and Campbell proposed that while people 
react to good and bad events, in a short time they return to a position of 
neutrality.65 The authors found that because people are goal-seeking in nature 
and constantly strive to be happy, happiness and unhappiness merely 
constituted temporary and short-lived reactions to such events.66 In what 
became a classic piece of research in the field, Brickman and his colleagues 
sought to provide empirical backing to the theory and from this concluded that 
lottery winners were not happier than non-winners, and that people with 
paraplegia were not substantially less happy than those who can walk.67  As 
Diener et al comment, the appeal of the study lay in it not only offering an 
explanation “for the observation that people appear to be relatively stable in 
happiness despite changes in fortune” but also in explaining why “people with 
substantial resources are sometimes no happier than those with few resources 
and that people with severe problems are sometimes quite happy.”68 
The theory has massive appeal at the intuitive level.  If we think of our 
lives to date, and consider all the good and bad events that have occurred, our 
joy at getting a new job, our heartache at the loss of a loved one, we’ll quickly 
be able to assess that the impact of emotions that we felt at that time, wears off.  
For many of us, we do indeed get used to things, and they soon become the 
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background in the context of the new and exciting events that lie ahead.  But, 
to what extent can this observation be useful to law? In 2007, a paper written 
by Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger sought to apply this theory directly 
to hedonic damages in the law of tort.69  What they claimed was that hedonic 
damages in the United States should not be awarded based on disability.70  
This head of damages broadly corresponds with aspects of intangible damages 
in the UK71 insofar as it compensates for the limitations on “the injured 
person’s ability to participate in and derive pleasure from the normal activities 
of daily life, or for the individual’s inability to pursue his talents, recreational 
interests, hobbies or avocations.”72  In something of a double-pronged attack 
on the practice of awarding hedonic damages given an emphasis upon 
disability equality and insights from psychology, the authors placed strong 
reliance upon adaptive preference theory noting that “disability does not 
inherently limit enjoyment of life to the degree that these courts suggest. 
Rather, people who experience disabling injuries tend to adapt to their 
disabilities.”73  Arguing that such damages and the processes of litigation 
might also be viewed as discriminatory, the authors claimed that the legal 
process serves to reinforce stigma around disability, in presenting disability “as 
a tragedy” and “people with disabilities as natural objects of pity.”74 
The work is fascinating and initially compelling.  It draws principally 
upon two distinct fields of knowledge, hedonic psychology as well as disability 
rights theory to critique and challenge aspects of legal policy.  The challenge 
seems to be motivated by equality concerns and justified by reference to hard 
science.  Moreover, it feeds directly into general anxieties about the extent to 
which legal policy, and indeed, tort law, fail to correspond to the ‘real world,’75 
as well as specific battles over non-pecuniary damages in the US, and the 
propriety of awarding them.76  The argument that a significant aspect of non-
pecuniary damages over-compensates victims for illusory losses hardly breaks 
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new ground in torts theory;77 however, what is novel, and begs to be taken 
more seriously by policy makers and legal academics, is the presentation of 
new ‘empirical evidence’ that has the weight of science standing behind it.  For 
us, the key question is: to what extent does Bagenstos and Schlanger’s 
recommendation for legal reform warrant serious consideration? 
An important starting point is that Bagenstos and Schlanger’s 
representation of adaptive preferences fails in significant ways to represent the 
science of adaptive preferences.  Insofar as their overarching argument hangs 
upon the empirical claim that people do adapt to their disabilities, in the 
absence of sufficient evidence to back up that claim, Bagenstos and 
Schlanger’s recommendations for legal reform must fail (though we might find 
the questions their work raises nevertheless interesting), at least on the 
particular grounds they offer. In this respect, the body of research around 
hedonic adaptation/adaptive preferences is very much a ‘work-in-progress.’  
Of course whilst ‘normal science’ can be typified as a work-in-progress in one 
important sense, given that science does not produce ultimate ‘truths’ but 
consists of a project committed to continual revision and refinement, there 
remains a need for some stable and critical core for a field of science to 
develop.  It is this stable and critical core which hedonic adaptation or adaptive 
preferences lacks.  Fitting Collins and Pinch’s conception of ‘Golem 
science,’78 the disputes in this field relate not to the periphery but to the central 
subject-matter.  Though Golem science has the “potential to become normal 
science, it has not yet reached closure to the satisfaction of the core-set.”79  In 
the context of hedonic adaptation, the field is replete with contradictory results 
and diametrically opposed findings as to the extent of adaptation can be found 
elsewhere.80  Richard Easterlin notes there is a demonstrable tendency in the 
psychological literature to overstate the extent of adaptation to life events, and 
that the extent of adaptation to a disabling condition may “vary depending on 
the personality or other characteristics of the individual affected.”81  In 
particular, the finding, which seems to be repeated throughout the literature 
subsequent to Brickman et al’s study, is that the assumption of the hedonic 
treadmill theory, notably that adaption to circumstances occurs in similar ways 
for all individuals, is simply false.  It is a theory which has failed “to come into 
its own in any empirical setting.”82  As Diener et al found in their longitudinal 
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studies, “the size and even the direction of the change in life satisfaction varied 
considerably across individuals.”83  Moreover, one of the key psychological 
proponents of the “science of happiness,” Daniel Kahneman, despite initial 
enthusiasm for the hedonic adaptation theory has subsequently noted: 
Social scientists rarely change their minds, although they often 
adjust their position to accommodate inconvenient facts.  But it is 
rare for a hypothesis to be so thoroughly falsified.  Merely adjusting 
my position would not do; although I still find the idea of an 
aspiration treadmill attractive, I had to give it up.84 
 There would seem then to be very good reasons why theorists within the 
field of hedonic psychology would be hesitant in making any claims as to the 
ubiquity of hedonic adaptation.  Diener et al cautioned against putting 
adaptation theory into practice given the many questions that necessitate 
researchers’ attention.85  Yet, in the face of there being “no clearly established 
theoretical consensus over whether people adapt . . . why people adapt, at what 
rate they adapt, when they adapt, or what increases or decreases rates of 
adaptation,”86 Bagenstos and Schlanger (who are lawyers, not psychologists) 
prove to be highly selective in the studies they incorporate (those highlighting 
a high level of adaptation), overlook all of the serious concerns attending 
hedonic psychology (articulated by experts within the field), and explicitly 
dismiss those like Richard Epstein who argues that the field lacks “conceptual 
coherence and empirical grounding.”87  Instead, the authors argue, “we take a 
different tack.  We agree with the theory’s proponents that adaptive 
preferences exist and that they raise significant normative questions about the 
unreflective use of preferences as a measure of justice or a basis for policy.”88 
Quite critically, insofar as the argument for the reform of the law of 
damages claims to be premised upon the science of adaptive preferences, a 
broader analysis of the field reveals that the claims are wholly unsupported.89  
Furthermore, this apparent tendency towards overstating the science or theory 
is also demonstrated through the authors’ engagement with other aspects of 
behavioural science,90 and disability rights theory.91  While some interesting 
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points do arise from their analysis, and we return to this later, from a policy-
making perspective, any policy recommendation made by these authors should 
be ignored for lack of scientific justification.  To be clear, however, we do not 
take issue with the overarching concerns these scholars raise about hedonic 
damages; on all accounts, it may be that the subjective nature of non-pecuniary 
losses resulting in compensation for lost happiness, pleasure, or well-being is 
problematic; it may well be that in law, as elsewhere, people’s self-reporting of 
their happiness is so inherently unreliable and unsusceptible to measurement as 
to pull it outside the reparative ideal.  It may be that hedonic damages are 
perceived as too expensive to be maintained.  Moreover, it may be that in time, 
these theorists’, despite skewing the “science,” turn out to be correct – that the 
psychological immune system is really extremely robust, and most of us are (or 
become) happy most of the time.  But for present purposes this is not borne out 
by the science.  As such, the claims that Bagenstos and Schlanger make are 
hypotheses, not science-based justifications to support certain policies.  While 
policy-makers may nevertheless decide to abolish hedonic damages on 
alternative grounds, the justification for such a policy could not be legitimately 
based upon the science of adaptive preferences at this time. 
B. Lawyers and Science 
I found that jurors wanted to ask questions about scientific and 
medical evidence in court because lawyers hadn’t asked the right 
questions . . . . Many lawyers have also never learnt how to present 
forensic evidence because they have no scientific training, despite 
the huge rise in the use of such evidence.  So people are potentially 
being convicted or acquitted wrongly because lawyers don’t know 
enough about science – it’s scary.92 
 It might be thought that the Bagenstos and Schlanger example is 
somewhat overdrawn so to present a particularly problematic and 
unrepresentative picture of legal interdisciplinarity.  It is not. Even in respect 
of hedonics alone, as Swedloff and Huang’s detailed critique of the “legal 
hedonist” movement reveals, the appeal of this theory and its potential for civil 
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law has led other high profile characters, including the co-author of Nudge, 
Cass Sunstein, to make similarly inflated claims about the reach and 
applicability of this nascent science.93  Nevertheless, the legal hedonist 
movement as an example of the troubled relationship between law and science 
is far from a one-off. 
To date, the kinds of problems we have flagged have attracted little 
attention within mainstream legal theory.  Some have, of course, intimated the 
potential for grave mistakes flowing from legal interdisciplinarity.94  Speaking 
of the lack of meaningful encounters with other disciplines, Douglas Vick 
noted how “the vast majority of lawyers lack the training and statistical 
competence to deal with research methods in non-legal disciplines.”95  Yet in 
terms of what that heralds in the context of a live and practical discipline 
which increasingly cannot ignore scientific issues, concerns as to the manner 
by which law meets science tend to be articulated from science and technology 
studies, or by groups possessing a special interest in how particular bodies of 
evidence are managed by lawyers as well as the ramifications for justice.96  
Promoting the importance of responsible science in the courtroom, Peter Huber 
provides a stunning account of how far courtroom science can fall short of this 
standard.97  He argues that in the context of torts litigation, the search for the 
“truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth has given way to reams of 
meaningless data, fearful speculation, and fantastic speculation.” 
An impact with a car’s steering wheel causes lung cancer.  Breast 
cancer is triggered by a fall from a streetcar, a slip in a grocery store, 
an exploding hot-water heater, a blow from an umbrella handle, and 
a bump from a can of orange juice.  Cancer is aggravated, if not 
actually caused, by lifting a forty-pound box of cheese.  Everybody 
knows, of course, that such stories are fiction.  (. . .) How can 
anybody be absolutely certain about these didn’ts, doesn’ts, and 
don’ts?  No one can.  But the science that refutes these claims is 
about as solid as science ever is.  And yet all of these bizarre and 
fantastic stories . . . are drawn not from the tabloids but from legal 
reports.98 
 The root of such problems, Sheila Jasanoff argues, may partly lie with the 
positivist view of science which is centralized within law.99  It is one which 
“presumes that science creates pictures of the real world and that the law 
merely seeks to recover,”100 where the role of the courts is to “defer to what 
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science already knows or to mimic as far as possible the dynamics of scientific 
inquiry within the courtroom.”101  The failure to recognize the inherent 
indeterminate nature of science, where “. . . scientific claims are intrinsically 
provisional, contingent, and subject to deconstruction under critical 
scrutiny”102 leaves lawyers finding causal connections where “. . . most 
experts, at best, see only connection and try[ing] to establish responsibility for 
harm on the basis of data or theories that have never graced the inside of a 
‘mainstream’ scientific text.”103  These concerns as they are manifested more 
broadly in the legal arena raise serious questions as to whether lawyers, the 
judiciary and indeed, policy-makers are “knowledgeable” consumers of 
science.  This parallels the concerns we highlighted in respect of Bagenstos 
and Schlanger, but with more immediately troubling effect. It cuts through 
nearly every aspect of the stuff of law, whether the use of scientific evidence in 
policy debates, of expert opinion in litigation, the analysis of forensic expert 
reports,104 to virtually every aspect of science as it intersects with matters of 
justice, liberty and regulatory policy.  Commenting specifically of the criminal 
justice system, Graham and McQueen note, 
As forensic experts, we see phylogenetic analysis increasingly being 
relied on in convictions by criminal courts and . . .we fear a renewed 
false confidence about the reliability of phylogenetic analysis to 
correctly reconstruct an HIV transmission history which may lead to 
risks of miscarriages of justice.105 
 This points to various problems.  The most apparent of these is an 
educational deficiency which becomes manifest within the legal arena.  
Hoffman, for example, argues that members of the legal community who rely 
upon these studies to formulate public policy or support litigation claims must 
learn to distinguish good science from bad.106  Yet while lawyers need to 
develop a stronger appreciation of the nature of science, those working within 
the field of science need a stronger appreciation of the nature of law.107  While 
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lawyers may lack the critical science literacy necessary to ask the “right” 
questions or distinguish good science from bad, the manner by which scientists 
acting as “experts” in the courtroom, present “science” is also critical. 
Scientists too can be criticized for “exaggerating their level of confidence, 
venturing into realms where they possess little experience or proffering partial 
accounts.”108  Speaking to this problem, Mertz notes in the context of family 
law, that lawyers and legal professionals who increasingly turn to 
psychological and relevant empirical research, are effectively moving “ . . . 
into new worlds[ ] for which a standard legal education leaves them poorly 
equipped.”109  Conversely, social science researchers “ . . . are frequently 
blissfully unaware of the realities of the legal universe into which their 
findings may be dropped.”110  As a consequence, she argues in such cases that 
“. . . a failure to carefully reflect on the translation process itself yields 
misleading results, paired with a misguided sense of overconfidence in the 
scientific validity of those results.”111 
Of course, science as it emerges within the courtroom admits of a far 
more foundational critique – one which goes to the heart of the legal project 
itself.  As Jasanoff notes, there is more in operation than merely “scientific 
illiteracy of legal factfinders and the corruption of self-proclaimed experts who 
are available for hire to represent baseless scientific positions.”112  There is 
also a need for a sociologically informed conception of the legal system, from 
the nature of the instruments and processes it uses to deconstruct “facts” to the 
very purpose of law and the manner by which “facts” are molded to fit the 
incentives the legal system creates.  Highlighting “overly romanticized views 
of the legal process,”113 Jasanoff points to the inherent logic of the adversarial 
process itself, and how it can create incentives to manufacturer scientific 
controversy where there is none, privileging “skepticism over consensus.”114 
Science emerging within the courtroom is transformed into disputable facts 
where “all facts” are treated as “equally contingent in a forum where 
adversaries have every incentive to overstate the weakness in each other’s 
positions.”115  This points, quite fundamentally, to a clash of worlds, rather 
than a stand-alone problem of literacy in the different cultures of law and 
science.  For while Mertz argues that rather than accepting that “indeterminacy 
may be an inextricable part of good science,”116 “judges and lawyers 
sometimes confuse a lack of complete certainty with a lack of validity”117 
which demonstrates a “systematic lack of appreciation among lawyers and 
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legal scholars for the scientific valence and value of indeterminacy.”118  She 
also notes the cultural differences of science and law that serve to differentially 
shape the way that evidence and “facts” are handled.119  While scientists “can 
take time to stand back and come to more precise conclusions,”120 they do not 
ignore inconvenient facts “that might upset their preconceptions.”121  By 
contrast, it is the job of advocates “to discredit facts that might undermine their 
clients’ cases.”122  As such, neither legal professionals “nor the people they 
serve are particularly interested in a long-winded, heavily hedged or deeply 
nuanced explanation of what is happening.  They must make choices and come 
to decisions.”123 
The intersection of law and science as it emerges within the courtroom 
points to a far broader problem than we attempt to tackle here, even if aspects 
of our analysis have some application to it. Rather, our aim here has been two-
fold.  Firstly, we sought to highlight how the kinds of concerns raised by 
Bagenstos and Schlanger’s interdisciplinary engagement with the science of 
hedonic adaptation is far more generalizable; law by its very nature is 
interdisciplinary and as such, legal practice is as susceptible to an epistemic 
analysis as legal academia.  As such we sought to link this to an existent body 
of literature which illustrates the troubling ramifications of a process which is 
in essence an interdisciplinary one for ideals of justice and legal policy.  
Secondly, insofar as those, like Mertz and Jasanoff ably illustrate that greater 
‘literacy’ in the worlds of law and science present only partial solutions for the 
problems they highlight (given for example, the adversarial process),124 a 
stronger appreciation of the nature of science nevertheless seems desirable.  
Indeed, it may prove critical for enabling legislators, judges and lawyers to 
reflect upon the justice system and to gain a sense of the problem that idealized 
forms of science entering the courtroom mean for the ideal of justice itself. 
Our primary audience, however, is the legal academic.  In our view she 
occupies a quite different position to that of the practicing lawyer or judge.  
While Mertz notes that “an action-orientated framework is in many ways the 
backbone of legal reasoning . . . the whole point of the legal system”125 and 
that even law professors come “to the material steeped in a legal framework 
that poses alternatives in unsubtle terms – yes or no, guilty or not guilty,”126 we 
adopt a more optimistic outlook. The legal academic, as well as those working 
within legislative and policy circles undoubtedly have a greater opportunity to 
stand outside of an institutional structure which creates perverse incentives for 
the emergence of hyper-real science.  That is not to say that there are no 
incentives to skew “science,” but that these can be minimized by raising the 
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profile of work which possesses a more experimental character, even if it offers 
no immediate value for policy-making purposes.  Key to this we argue, is an 
appreciation of the nature of knowledge, the social processes critical for its 
formation and the limits of expertise and understanding.  To a very significant 
degree, this helps to explain why the worlds of law and science do clash, and 
the very significant obstacles presented to the interdisciplinary paradigm. 
C. Interdisciplinary Literacy: Sociology of Expertise and Experience 
Here we outline aspects of the theory of expertises and how this provides 
a critical lens for thinking about interdisciplinary research and its limits from a 
policy-making perspective.  Earlier we argued that Bagenstos and Schlanger 
had misrepresented the field of hedonic adaptation, and intimated that there 
was some central misunderstanding around the science that underpinned 
this.127  We now clarify our position to illustrate what that misunderstanding 
consisted of, and in particular, to illustrate how “lone” legal researchers like 
Bagenstos and Schlanger confront insurmountable barriers to the kind of 
understanding necessary for making epistemic claims where these depend upon 
insights from foreign domains of knowledge.  This approach starkly contrasts 
with that adopted by Douglas Vick, who in a well-considered piece around 
legal interdisciplinary, warned of the kinds of problems awaiting legal scholars 
travelling to different fields for inspiration and insights.128  Resonating with 
Mertz’s conception of ‘different worlds’, Vick noted, 
[T]here are traps for the unwary. Most of these pitfalls relate to the 
difficulty of adequately understanding disciplines other than your 
own – or worse, thinking you understand them when you do 
not. . . .It is easy to misapprehend – or be completely unaware of – 
the nuances of other disciplines: the terms and concepts used and 
distinctions made in ‘foreign’ disciplines are usually encountered in 
a piecemeal fashion and can be confused with seemingly similar 
concepts and distinctions in the researcher’s home field. The 
assumptions underlying the theoretical precepts or research 
techniques of other disciplines are often so subtle that they escape 
the non-specialist, and misunderstanding even seemingly minor 
details can prove fatal to the validity of an entire research project. So 
can the failure to appreciate the biases and limitations of the 
research methods of other disciplines – and all research methods 
have biases and limitations. Another hazard is misinterpreting 
research results: academic lawyers can be prone to the danger of 
attributing greater credence or significance to results obtained 
through ‘scientific’ research methods (that is, those that involve the 
use of numbers).129 
Conceivably, Bagenstos and Schlanger’s interdisciplinary engagement 
with fields such as psychology could be assessed in light of Vick’s account 
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insofar as he outlines some of the problems inherent in interdisciplinary work.  
And to a significant extent, it can be strongly aligned to the theoretical 
approach that we adopt.  However, where we sharply depart from Vick’s 
position is in respect of what may turn out to be a largely rhetorical argument 
(given the extent of the barriers he outlines)130 to the effect that the ‘wary’ may 
in some way avoid these hazards, or that the obstacles outlined are ones that 
with effort might be overcome.  On these issues, we take a contrary view and 
with quite profound consequences for legal interdisciplinary work. Our 
argument relies upon Collins and Evans’ Theory of Expertise, which 
constitutes part of a project of research within the Sociology of Expertise and 
Experience.131  It provides a comprehensive theory of the social processes by 
which different types of expertises are acquired.  This theory explicates what is 
needed for real and substantive expertise and the limits of our expertise and 
understanding.  Providing a theoretical guide to what one cannot understand 
and appreciating what one cannot know that underpins our thesis as to why 
lone interdisciplinarity endeavours hold no immediate value in political or 
policy-making terms. 
D. Tacit Knowledge: The Difference between Understanding  
and ‘Deep Understanding’ 
A policy-maker being presented with arguments from Bagenstos and 
Schlanger would undoubtedly see claims founded directly on the basis of 
substantive science.132  There is no doubt that in respect of the specific 
scientific research that Bagenstos and Schlanger relied upon, they 
“understood” those scientific sources well enough to summarize and to 
incorporate them into the narrative of their own paper.133  We argue, however, 
that they lack a “deep understanding” due to their failure to take into account 
the broader context of the scientific domain in which hedonic adaptation 
research is conducted. 
The acquisition of “deep understanding” is central to Collins and Evans’ 
theory of expertise.134  The key driver of their concept of expertise is “tacit 
knowledge.”135  To be an expert on something means that one has acquired 
particular bodies of tacit knowledge—the unwritten rules, processes and 
conventions which are central to any domain of human activity.136  By contrast 
with explicit knowledge, which can be expressed in formal language and 
shared through texts, manuals or explanation, tacit knowledge cannot be 
formalized.137  As Nonaka et al. note, “[t]acit knowledge is deeply rooted in 
action, procedures, routines, commitments, ideals, values and emotions” and 
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describes an “analogue process that requires a kind of ‘simultaneous 
processing.’”138  Tacit knowledge can be defined as knowledge “which has not 
or cannot be made explicit.”139  It is the knowledge that makes the deep 
understanding of explicit knowledge possible.140  It is the knowledge that 
enables us to apply explicit knowledge in new situations and under changing 
circumstances.  It is also the knowledge that makes the acquisition and the 
appropriate use of explicit possible.  While it cannot be directly observed, tacit 
knowledge manifests itself in people’s abilities.  The importance afforded to 
tacit knowledge does not mean that explicit knowledge, notably the knowledge 
that can be articulated or written down, is no longer important.  Rather, explicit 
knowledge of facts remains a significant characteristic of experts.  It is, 
however, the presence of tacit knowledge that enables actors to ‘deeply 
understand’ something. 141 
Collins and Evans’s concept of expertise is inherently “social.”142  As 
Collins and Evans explain, this is because bodies of tacit knowledge are 
“developed” and “maintained” in social groups,143 which in turn means that 
tacit knowledge is not the property of an individual.  As such, the only way for 
an individual to tap into these “bodies” of tacit knowledge is to actively 
immerse him or herself into the social group that possesses certain kinds of 
tacit knowledge.  Thus, mastering a tacit knowledge-laden specialism to a high 
level of expertise, whether car-driving or gravitational wave physics, can be 
likened to learning a natural language. It is attained by interactive immersion in 
the way of life of the culture rather than by extended studies of dictionaries or 
grammars of their equivalents.144  To acquire tacit knowledge that is specific to 
lawyers, for example, one has to actively immerse oneself into the legal 
community, which means one has to either perform legally-specific practices 
or one has to talk to them about things that lawyers do and experience.  
Reading textbooks on law is insufficient to pick up the community-specific 
tacit knowledge; since tacit knowledge cannot be made explicit, it gets ‘lost’ 
when instructions are written down or when they are audio-recorded.  It will be 
obvious that in order to become a “legal expert,” to represent a client, to know 
how to prepare a case, negotiate a settlement, behave in court, engage with 
other lawyers, identify a “meritorious” case, anticipate likely outcomes, and so 
on, one needs to do more than merely read books.  In this respect, to a very 
significant extent, law is not logic, but experience and immersion in the life of 
the law. 
Another important implication of linking expertise to tacit knowledge is 
related to the distribution of expertise.  Collins and Evans distinguish explicitly 
between “ubiquitous expertises” and “specialist expertises.”145  “Ubiquitous 
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expertises” are widely distributed; to master them, it is sufficient to be 
immersed in everyday social life.146  The possibility of “ubiquitous expertise” 
is provided by the theory of expertise proposed by Collins and Evans,147 
because tacit knowledge is involved in every meaningful or intentional human 
practice.  Whether an actor walks on a busy pavement, uses a pocket 
calculator, utters a sentence in natural language, makes a bed, prepares for a 
date – all these activities involve tacit knowledge.  Some skills, such as the 
ability to speak English fluently in the U.K., are so widely distributed that an 
actor simply has to grow up in the U.K. in order to master the skill.  In other 
words, there is no need for an actor to immerse herself deliberately into a 
specific subpopulation to learn English.  While some expertises can be 
regarded as ubiquitous in certain settings, others are not.  For example, it is not 
enough to be socialized in a Western society to possess the ability to interpret 
the raw data provided by a large-scale clinical trial in an acceptable way, 
perform a body-domination sadomasochistic practice in a way that pleases 
someone prepared to pay for this service, or breed sheep in a way to produce 
lamb meat that meets EU standards.  The tacit knowledge required for this set 
of activities is developed and maintained by certain specialized groups within a 
wider society.  Most people do not usually interact with members of such 
groups (at least not in their capacity as members of this specialist group) and 
are therefore unable to acquire the tacit knowledge related to those activities. 
This explains why certain forms of expertise are not ubiquitous.  “Specialist 
expertises,” in contrast, are expertises that relate to specific and often very 
narrow domains of knowledge such as physics, carpentry, or sheep-farming.148  
While the tacit knowledge related to such domains can only be picked up by 
immersion into the community of those who possess it, this does not mean that 
domain-specific knowledge is entirely out of reach to outsiders.  Collins and 
Evans distinguish five forms of specialist expertise.149 
 
Figure 1 (Extracted from the Periodic Table of Expertises)150 
 
The first three types, Beer Mat Knowledge,151 Popular Understanding,152 
and Primary Source Knowledge153 can be described as “levels of knowledge” 
rather than as expertises.  This is because the tacit knowledge needed to 
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acquire those levels of knowledge is ubiquitous (widely spread).  To gain, say, 
the level of popular understanding about cancer research, actors have to master 
such ubiquitous expertises such as the ability to buy a magazine or book, and 
to read it. 
“Interactional expertise” and “contributory expertise,” in contrast, are 
full-blown specialist expertises that require the acquisition of domain specific 
tacit knowledge.154  This requires the active immersion into expert 
communities.155  Contributory expertise refers to expertise that enables an actor 
to perform a skilled practice within the specialist domain.156  Thus, the actor is 
able to do things within the domain of expertise and is therefore contributing to 
the activities that constitute the domain.  A classic example would be the 
ability of a goldsmith to transform a lump of gold into a ring.  There are 
obviously grades of contributory expertise.  For example, an apprentice would 
not be expected to produce a ring of the same quality as a master craftsman.  
But the point is that someone without contributory expertise could not perform 
the skilled practice at all. 
Interactional expertise is not linked to the ability to perform a skilled 
practice; rather it is “expertise in the language of a specialism in the absence of 
expertise in its practice.”157  Interactional expertise refers to the ability to talk 
as if one were a full-blown contributory expert without actually being able to 
perform a skilled practice of a specialist domain.158  A good example of an 
interactional expert is a successful ethnographer.  Ideally, an ethnographer 
avoids “going native,” but on return from an extended period immersed into 
the culture under observation, the ethnographer should be able to give an 
account of the culture as if it is her own.159 
E. The Glass Wall: Interdisciplinarity and Expertise 
Earlier we noted how works like Nudge aim to make aspects of science 
accessible to the public at large.  We also noted that while works of the Nudge 
variety serve to mask a large body of scientific research, such that the science 
behind the science was hidden from sight, even in the context of roaming 
around the internet and finding scientific papers, aspects of those primary 
sources can appear fairly comprehensible given an increased emphasis on a 
standardized format, openness, and transparency.  But there are limits.  
Through an application of the theory of expertise, we underpin how thin that 
level of comprehension will necessarily be in the absence of social or linguistic 
immersion in the expert domain itself.  As such, while “science” may appear 
accessible and comprehensible, there is a “glass wall” that prevents outsiders 
from being able to gain the kind of “deep understanding” necessary to access 
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or comprehend research undertaken within expert communities.  Critically, this 
consists of the tacit/unwritten conventions, procedures, practices, and language 
in which one must become ‘fluent’ in order to have depth of understanding and 
expertise. 
On the problem before us of lawyers drawing upon psychology, 
behavioural economics, or other fields in which that individual has not been 
immersed within the domain specific community of experts, ubiquitous social 
understanding is left as the only plausible basis for expertise.  Without direct 
social contact or active immersion into an expert community, the highest level 
of specialist expertise an actor can reach according to the periodic table of 
expertises is ‘Primary Source Knowledge.’160  By contrast with ‘Beer Mat 
Knowledge’ or ‘Popular Understanding,’ this kind of knowledge comes with 
reading primary or quasi-primary literature,161 such as scientific papers and 
journal articles.  By contrast with “Beer Mat Knowledge” or “Popular 
Understanding,” this kind of knowledge comes with reading primary or quasi-
primary literature,162 such as scientific papers and journal articles.  Those 
depending solely on Primary Source Knowledge (PSK) face a number of 
problems when they try attempting to make technical judgments in foreign 
domains.163  By reading primary sources in isolation, it is impossible to acquire 
technical tacit knowledge and, more important, domain-specific social 
understanding.  Those depending on PSK have to make policy-relevant 
technical judgements on the basis of ubiquitous discrimination. 
An initial problem for those relying solely on PSK is that they cannot 
access the full scientific discourse.  According to Collins and Evans, there is a 
significant difference between the “published discourse” and what might be 
called the “oral discourse” of a scientific community: 
[I]t can be shown that what is found in the literature, if read by 
someone with no contact with the core-groups of scientists who 
actually carry out the research in disputed areas, can give a false 
impression of the content of the science as well as the level of 
certainty.  Many of the papers in the professional literature are never 
read, so if one wants to gain something even approximating to a 
rough version of agreed scientific knowledge from published 
sources one has first to know what to read and what not to read; this 
requires social contact with the expert community.164  
Collins and Evans argue that it is wrong to assume that the written and the 
oral discourse relating to a specific scientific domain are the same.165  The non-
expert, on the basis of exclusively reading scientific sources, is at risk of 
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developing a “false impression of the content of the science as well as the level 
of certainty.”166  Even if it is assumed for a moment that oral and published 
scientific discourse overlap to such an extent that the difference between the 
two becomes almost irrelevant, someone relying upon Primary Source 
Knowledge (PSK) alone to understand science confronts other problems too. 
First, there is often a simple logistical problem in that the body of 
technical literature on an issue can be so large that it becomes almost 
impossible to read everything that has been written on the subject.  Second, 
even if it is assumed that an outsider is able to read every piece of literature, 
this still does not solve all of the problems of PSK.  The next problem an actor 
relying solely upon PSK faces is to make a range of judgements such as 
judging the relevance of the literature, its relative importance, its reliability, as 
well as the quality or permissibility of certain technical claims.  By virtue of 
having read papers in isolation, one is unlikely to be able to assess the 
credibility of the work given the inability of knowing how it is viewed by 
others in the field, the quality of the journal, and so on.  The third problem 
outsiders will confront, relates to the assessment of the relative importance of 
technical claims made in the literature.  A range of technical considerations 
impact on the interpretation of the relevance of a particular paper such as 
knowledge about the quality of the method employed in a paper, knowledge of 
the findings of similar studies and knowledge of the benefits against which the 
findings have to be balanced and so on.  A fourth problem associated with 
trying to understand technicalities on the basis of solely reading literature is 
that it is very difficult to assess the quality of technical arguments.  Outsiders 
might be able to assess the coherence and consistency of technical arguments 
even though they might not fully understand them.  The problem is that the 
plausibility of arguments might hinge upon some technical claims that 
outsiders find impossible to evaluate in detail.  Rather, more often one with 
PSK will have to take the claims of the paper on face value or on trust.167 
F. Interactional Research and Simulation (“Crash Test”) Research 
Of course, the foregoing coincides with the kinds of problems which Vick 
outlined in his account of the “traps for the unwary” legal 
interdisciplinarian.168  The difference, however, is that what Vick 
conceptualizes as “traps” or “obstacles,” we understand to constitute 
insurmountable barriers in the context of interdisciplinary efforts of a lone 
researcher.  The expertise criterion helps to demarcate between those with and 
without genuine technical understanding.  As we illustrated in the previous 
section, those with high levels of explicit knowledge gained through reading 
primary scientific sources lack the domain-relevant tacit knowledge which is 
critical for the ability to make technical judgments on technical grounds.  As 
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such, it becomes easier to see how errors of the sort that Bagenstos and 
Schlanger made in their assessment of hedonic adaptation (and indeed, 
disability rights politics) and its applicability to the civil law of damages, can 
occur.  On the basis of lacking specialist expertise, their evaluation of the 
science must be regarded as an illegitimate assessment of a technical issue. 
It is argued that the obstacles for making technical judgments on the basis 
of technical considerations for those relying on PSK are insurmountable.169  It 
has to be noted that PSK does not always lead to judgments that contradict 
those made by technical experts.  Had Bagenstos and Schlanger consumed 
work in the field more broadly their views on hedonic damages may have been 
refined or their thesis at least disrupted (and would certainly have resulted in a 
very different and far more tentative paper).  Nevertheless, in relation to those 
possessing PSK, the fact of broader reading cannot be depended upon; such 
readings of technical material are more likely to be based on chance and not on 
experience and genuine understanding. 
These concerns may well be amplified in the context of the legal 
discipline in evaluating the kinds of skills and training offered to lawyers in 
preparing them for practice or academic careers. We have already noted 
contributors, who, concerned with the intersection between courtroom law, 
legal policy and science, attribute many of these problems to serious 
deficiencies in legal education. Law may often intersect with science, and 
science is surely critical to those who call out for law to be informed by the 
“real world,” but lawyers are not typically perceived as constituents for whom 
an understanding of scientific method is demanded.170  As a result, other than 
those graduating from particularly enterprising law schools most lawyers lack 
basic linguistic abilities in science and scientific method.171  This is pretty 
fundamental, for in the absence of an appreciation of the manner by which 
scientific knowledge is formed, it should be unsurprising that those who travel 
into new domains of knowledge for insight and inspiration will frequently, and 
unwittingly, overstep critical epistemic boundaries.  Despite Simon’s 
encouraging view that academic law is “embracing empirical studies far more 
broadly than in the past and law faculties increasingly have the capacity to 
train lawyers in social science methodology,”172 it remains the case that central 
to legal education is the aspiration to “produce skilled doctrinal lawyers.”173  
As Roger Cotterrell has recently come to reflect despite the prized status of 
socio-legal research, it “has not modified the most basic patterns of legal 
thinking. It has not much disturbed the jurists.”174  Hillyard’s lament, in respect 
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to some of the stubborn features of legal academia which constitute significant 
barriers to a different legal paradigm, remains every bit as germane over one 
decade later. 
The requirements of professional practice place very real constraints 
on the undergraduate curriculum and the type of staff who can be 
recruited. . . .[T]here is little or no room for research training courses 
similar to those in other social sciences. . . .[Law] is characterized by 
the lone researcher who is not accustomed to working as part of a 
team, and law schools themselves have traditionally been physically 
and intellectually isolated from colleagues in the social sciences.175   
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the potential benefits of even 
the most fundamental changes to legal education where grounding in scientific 
method becomes central.  Undoubtedly, an appreciation of scientific method 
would provide the kind of epistemic humility that helps actors to understand 
the limits of their understanding and expertise.  Nevertheless, this would 
underpin, rather than contradict, the kinds of conclusions that we have arrived 
at in respect of the interdisciplinary paradigm. 
It should be emphasized that none of this points to a necessary demise in 
respect of the kind of research efforts that legal scholars can, or should, 
undertake.  That would be a lamentable, if not unrealistic, conclusion.  There is 
no doubt that the kind of work being undertaken in the context of the 
“behavioural turn” is valuable and important in pointing towards potential 
flaws in the existing regulatory architecture and to more fruitful possibilities 
for a social governance agenda. For most, and certainly those within the socio-
legal tradition, the need for law to connect to the social world and to disrupt a 
field which some have argued, “is not really affected in any way whatsoever by 
the fact that a text or a precedent has had a negative social, political or 
economic effect,”176 is critical and necessary.  We do not seek to quell the 
appetite of authors who embrace insights from foreign domains of knowledge 
or to experiment with ideas; indeed such intellectual tourism is constitutive of 
work which is to a very significant degree valuable and necessary for the legal 
project. 
Instead, and flowing from the theory of expertises, we argue for a key 
distinction to be drawn between two kinds of interdisciplinary efforts: 
interactional research177 and simulation research. From a policy perspective, 
both should be regarded as having significant value for the project of law, 
though we should value them in different ways.  In respect of interactional 
research, this follows the logic of what we argued earlier in this piece.  While 
Douglas Vick commented that “[u]ntil there is greater acceptance by academic 
lawyers of collaborative research, meaningful disciplinary encounters 
involving law will remain elusive,”178 our analysis points to the impossibility 
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of meaningful interdisciplinary encounters in the absence of collaborative 
research with those possessing specialist tacit knowledge from the non-legal 
domain.  Yet while many point to the problems of collaborative work—the 
level of compromise, negotiation, time and learning required, to a degree that 
involves a “longer and more complex process than researching within a 
discipline”179—not all collaborative efforts need to consist of the enormous 
project work that is often envisaged.  The kind of project work that led 
Bagenstos and Schlanger to apply hedonic adaptation and disability rights 
theory to the civil law of damages,180 for example, was highly amenable to 
external evaluation by specialists from the non-law domains in question.  A 
simple exchange would have quickly pointed to the fact that the thesis the 
authors were working with was not representative of the scientific field.  As 
such, their work instead forwarded an empirical assertion rather than an 
argument justified by reference to empirical evidence.  While such a dialogue 
would have shaped a quite different paper, both in form and substance, the 
authors’ approach to the civil law of damages could still have stood as a 
valuable hypothesis for scholars within a variety of fields to explore and test 
empirically with an eye to other normative concerns about the extent to which 
hedonic damages are viewed as a problematic category.  From this perspective, 
we see Bagenstos and Schlanger’s work as holding significant merit, even if it 
holds no political or policy-making value.  In this latter respect, this underpins 
the second category of interdisciplinarity, simulation research. 
It is important to note that what we advocate in respect of this latter 
category itself is of a highly tentative nature.  We do not seek here to expand 
too much on this aspect given that a broader conversation within legal 
scholarship is appropriate for its progression.  The basic essence of simulation 
research, or “crash test research” is that it constitutes an open testing zone for 
modeling hypotheses, refining aspects of a problem and developing new 
research angles.  Nevertheless, as the concept of “crash test” or “simulation” 
implies, such a process could not be undertaken in the real world given the 
highly experimental nature of such work, in which developers are testing out a 
broad range of variables, some of which may be wholly uncertain or 
unreliable.  In the case of legal interdisciplinarity, uncertain or unreliable 
variables of this sort would include the introduction of non-legal domain 
knowledge, which would demand verification (interactional research), and 
indeed broader testing to underpin the applicability of the science to a live 
policy-context.  As such, results of a test design should be considered 
productive of mere hypotheses, rather than fully-fledged ideas which could go 
live. 
A number of points can be made in respect of our motivation for this 
category and the importance we afford it.  Firstly, given the logic of our 
arguments so far, there is an opposite risk that we wish to temper: too strong a 
preoccupation with expertise and specialism can hinder the development of 
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knowledge and the formation of new ideas which could prove critical.  As 
Stancil notes, “each discipline has something important to say about virtually 
every problem of social governance. Moreover, the complexities of the real 
world dictate that no single discipline standing alone can offer practical and 
effective solutions to those problems.”181  Few of us have the time or ability to 
develop and maintain contributory expertise in two areas given that expertise 
extends beyond the possession of mere credentials and qualifications in a field, 
and requires continued social immersion in those fields.  Furthermore, insofar 
as we noted the presence of light touch forms of collaboration, for many 
projects and for those entering into particularly complex fields, mere electronic 
communication will be insufficient.  As such, many interdisciplinary projects 
will have significant barriers to the kind of collaborative ideal which underpins 
interactional research: temporal, spatial, institutional and economic.  As such, a 
paradigm of interdisciplinarity which rests purely upon the interactional ideal, 
though critical for work that we can consider valuable in a political or policy-
making context, could be deeply harmful if it became the model for 
interdisciplinary investigation.  It would be tantamount to disciplining 
interdisciplinary work in problematic ways.  For law, which is dominated by a 
lone researcher ideal, it would prove disastrous.  Particular works which could 
be of great value would simply not occur.  Secondly, and related to this, where 
simulation research is valued as a process of testing and design (rather than as 
holding immediate purchase to policy-makers or the development of law), 
concerns around the presence of mistakes of the kind we noted in respect of 
Bagenstos and Schlanger, dissipate rapidly.  Even works replete with 
interdisciplinary misappropriations pose no genuine concerns where the 
audience knows to anticipate this as a strong possibility.  It is important to 
recognize that there can be tremendous value in error (indeed the scientific 
paradigm hangs upon it).  As Schulz argues, “far from being a sign of 
intellectual inferiority, the capacity to err is crucial to human cognition . . . . 
Thanks to error, we can revise our understanding of ourselves and amend our 
ideas about the world.”182  This is not to advocate sloppiness in research, but 
simply to note that for the reasons that we have highlighted there is a high risk 
of error in lone interdisciplinarity.  As part of academic creativity and a process 
which is seen as inherently work-in-progress, we can instead embrace it not 
only as a possibility, but a probability.  As Kellert notes in a sophisticated and 
applied account of “borrowing” from chaos theory, “sometimes errors 
represent nothing more than honest and harmless mistakes.”183  Even quite 
fundamental mistakes need not always result in terrible outcomes, but can 
actually result in positive ones, given that “many fruitful advances in social 
thought have come from situations in which the concept originating in natural 
science was not fully understood; Darwin got Malthus wrong, and Freud 
misread Helmholz.”184 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Socio-legal scholarship (theory and empirical research) has to 
invade the law school.  But this is certainly not to turn law schools 
into social science departments, and not to make legal analysis into 
sociological jurisprudence (that is, social science on tap to help the 
lawyers when they feel they need it).  It is to make the study of law a 
great conversation that draws on the whole range of types of 
knowledge necessary to make that conversation an informed one.185 
The quote above underpins the basic spirit of this contribution.  The 
present piece positions itself as an interactional “socio-legal” engagement in 
applying an aspect of sociological research from the field of the Sociology of 
Expertise and Experience, to the domain of law.  While Cotterrell speaks of the 
importance of an informed conversation186 which is populated by a range of 
actors, this has been central to our thesis.  The aim of this article has been to 
highlight the importance of ‘knowing what one is talking about,’ and in 
particular, underpinning the limits of what one can know and the implications 
for legal interdisciplinary academic research.  We approached the problem 
domain with two particular ends in sight; the first of which has been to 
highlight the distinction between lone versus genuinely collaborative work in 
the context of researchers engaging with foreign domains of knowledge, or 
indeed of those coming to evaluate the reliability or usefulness of the resulting 
interdisciplinary works.  Central to this has been the theory of expertise, which 
illustrates why interdisciplinary investigations conducted without interactional 
or contributory expertise will result in haphazard, erroneous or unreliable 
results so that we should place little if any value on those works from a policy-
making angle.  Conversely, interdisciplinary engagements which are the 
product of a genuine interdisciplinary collaboration are ones which will likely 
lead to sounder, more carefully compiled research outcomes which bear a more 
incremental character. 
Our second aim has been to ensure that all forms of interdisciplinarity 
may have the opportunity to flourish.  Although we argued that policy-making 
value can be attributed to interactional interdisciplinary endeavours, we noted 
that other forms of interdisciplinary engagement should also be seen as 
valuable.  While falling short of the kind of work which could form the 
immediate basis of policy or social governance architecture, works of a more 
provisional and creative character, nevertheless hold great potential.  These can 
prove critical to the identification of potentially promising hypotheses (or 
indeed flawed ones), illustrate the state of science in a particular field and its 
potential application to law, and importantly, act as a valuable precursor, or 
‘under-labourer’ for interactional research.  In this latter respect, insofar as 
some time was invested in assessing “problem” works such as that offered by 
Bagenstos and Schlanger, none of this is to diminish its academic value.  
Rather, it raises important questions directly and indirectly around the 
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management of injury and harm in torts and the reparative ideal. 
Our hesitancy in advocating “simulation research” more strongly than we 
have, relates in part to a concern that it requires more dedicated analysis than 
can be accommodated here, or by us alone.  We believe that there is 
considerable promise in the distinction between interactional research and 
simulation research insofar as it fosters the broadest range of research, and in 
part describes a range of legal interdisciplinary endeavours that already 
populate legal journals, edited collections, monographs as well as existing 
project work—even if they are not presently typified as either simulated or 
interactional.  Our hope is that the tools we outline help to make this 
distinction, which has “knowledge” at its heart, will prove to be useful for 
actors engaging in, or judging the value of legal interdisciplinary work.  
Nevertheless, we do recognize that there are other questions that can be validly 
raised in respect of how precisely these distinctions are operationalized within 
the legal discipline.  For present purposes we consider the value of our 
contribution to lie in harmonizing and valuing a range of quite distinct 
approaches to the question of how interdisciplinarity ought to be done,187 
though critically by centralizing what we see as critical: the question of 
expertise, in following the epistemic logic of Collins and Evans’ theory of 
expertises.  Nevertheless, in respect of simulated research, there are broader 
considerations that need to be taken into account.  Insofar as Stancil notes that 
“there is virtually no place in the legal academy for pure curiosity-driven 
‘basic research,’”188 this constitutes, in our view, a significant hindrance to the 
kind of interdisciplinary work which could prove fruitful to the legal project, 
which may be unique in being both relatively autonomous from the scientific 
disciplines, but nevertheless critically dependent upon them. 
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